Key to electricity sector restructuring was the creation of incentives for adequate investment in generation capacity. Regulators have often applied dissimilar solutions. This article explores experimentally the relationship between market design, price competition, and capacity provision in electricity markets. Subjects act as firms, choose their generation capacity and compete in prices in a uniform price auction market. We compare three regulatory regimes: a price cap regime restricting scarcity rents, a price spike regime allowing for scarcity rents and a capacity market regime. Restricting price spikes leads to underinvestment. Both alternative designs yield su cient investment albeit at higher energy prices in the price spike and at relatively high capacity payments in the capacity market regime. We thereby confirm the regulatory intention in either regime experimentally. However, we find that a higher price cap does not translate into equally higher market prices. Second, we find the capacity market regime does not reduce market power.
Introduction
Many of today's power markets feature di↵erent mechanisms to govern payments to generators and thus to guide investment and reserve margins. In a laissez-faire environment, the level and duration of price spikes determines the incentives to invest in peak generation. In the Australian market, for instance, a price cap of 13.800 A$/MWh allows for high price spikes and thus market signals to guide investment decisions. In contrast, in the UK and most organized US power markets, with the exception of the ERCOT market in Texas, price caps are relatively low, oftentimes binding, and restrict revenues during times of peak demand. Investment instead is guided by capacity markets, where producers receive explicit payments for providing capacity to the market.
The purpose of this article is to compare these di↵erent mechanisms in terms of their e ciency properties, that is their ability to e ciently provide capacity. We consider three energy market designs that vary in their price cap and in capacity payments. Empirical strategies to this research agenda are challenging as counterfactual market outcomes do not exist. Therefore we pursue an experimental approach that allows to compare di↵erent regulatory regimes within a well-defined environment.
Our analysis entails a benchmark market design, an energy only market with a low price cap that leads to underinvestment and abuse of market power during peak demand. We then treat the market by doubling the price cap. A higher price cap leads to higher price spikes and increases investments. Our alternative treatment entails a capacity market stage prior to energy market competition. In this regime, the energy price cap is set low and binding as in the benchmark case but capacity prices incentivize investment. We find that the capacity market rules out shortages, however it does not rule out market power. Thus we cannot confirm a pro-competitive e↵ect of increasing investment via capacity markets.
As market power abuse occurs in all three regimes, our benchmark treatment performs worst as both underinvestment and market power prevail. As predicted by our hypotheses, each alternative design cures underinvestment, albeit at di↵er-ent costs arising from higher energy prices or capacity payments.
We however surprisingly find that increasing the price cap does not increase equilibrium prices by a corresponding amount, despite our experimental design with completely inelastic demand. An increase in the price cap instead increases energy market prices by less than the increase in the cap. Note that we set the price cap in the price spike regime such that su cient investment should occur, while the low benchmark price cap does not provide su cient revenue to build peak generation capacity. We conjecture that when price caps are high enough to not constrain the revenue needed to invest in su cient capacity, the possibility of high prices increases competitive investment which in turn determines and self-regulates equilibrium energy prices.
The experimental design applied for the analysis is inspired by several real world features of electricity markets, such as limited numbers of suppliers and stochastic demand. In our setup, four identical generating firms (also referred to as subjects) interact in repeated multi-unit auctions competing to supply electricity. Demand is perfectly inelastic and volatile, both with a deterministic element (with known periods of peak and o↵-peak demand) and a stochastic element (demand varies within peak and o↵-peak periods). Subjects have to make two types of decisions. Initially, they have to decide on how much capacity to make available to the market. Then they submit repeatedly multi-step supply functions, i.e. schedules of quantities and prices specifying how much they are willing to supply at or above a given price.
Subjects are partitioned into three treatments. First, subjects take part in an energy market with restricting price caps, that is price caps that do not allow for fixed cost recovery of peaking units. We denote this baseline case as the LowCap treatment. Second, subjects participate in an energy market with adequate price caps. In this HighCap treatment, the price cap allows for financing peaking units. Third, subjects compete in a capacity market where capacity payments are determined before energy market competition takes place. This treatment is labelled as CapMarket. The energy price cap in this treatment is the same as in LowCap. Generating units that receive capacity payments have to be o↵ered in each subsequent energy market period. This design is similar to the New York State or New England capacity markets where capacity payments oblige to o↵er capacity for many periods (either for an entire month or several years).
So far few theoretical articles have explicitly focused on the e↵ect of capacity markets and price caps on electricity spot market competition. Joskow and Tirole (2007) show how binding price caps together with capacity obligations can restore investment incentives. Creti and Fabra (2007) show that the competitive e↵ect of capacity markets depends on the opportunity costs of committing to capacity resources when producers have the option to export their electricity. Cramton et al. (2013) provide an overview on the workings of capacity markets and argue why capacity markets are needed when demand is inelastic. Empirical work has been done on the exercise of market power in deregulated electricity markets (e.g. Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002; or Hortacsu and Puller 2008) , but very few have focused on the competitive e↵ect of price caps or capacity markets. Wolfram (1999) analyzes the introduction of a price cap in the UK market and shows the distorting e↵ect on bidding behavior. Schwenen (2015) analyzes strategic bidding in capacity markets in the New York ISO capacity market and finds how simple bidding strategies su ce to abuse dominant positions.
The relevant experimental literature on multi-unit auctions is relatively small (see Engelmann and Grimm (2009) for an overview). While few experimental papers focus on electricity markets (e.g. Abbink et al. (2003) , von Koten and Ortmann, 2013, or Brandts et al., 2014) , to the best of our knowledge, there are only two experimental studies on the impact of price caps in a multi-unit uniform price auction and none on the e↵ect of capacity markets. The focus of these studies, however, is on price caps that di↵er across firms (Kiesling and Wilson 2006) and on non-binding price caps (Vossler et al., 2009) . Because in electricity markets price caps generally do not di↵er across firms, our analysis considers di↵erent price cap levels which are applicable to all market participants. Moreover, our experimental design tests the e↵ect of increasing price caps and adding a capacity market on the investment and pricing performance.
With regard to the experimental literature, this article is most closely related to the study by Brandts et al. (2014) who apply a similar multi-unit auction environment and find that pivotal suppliers (i.e. suppliers whos capacity is needed to cover all demand) exercise market power as predicted by theory, as for instance in Fabra et al. (2006) . While we also find that market prices are positively correlated with the existence of pivotal suppliers, we contribute by changing the price cap and showing that higher price caps attract larger investment -leading to less market situtations with pivotal supplier power.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the design of the experiment and introduce the three treatments considered. Section 3 derives our hypotheses, relying on the existing literature on multi-unit auctions. In section 4 we present the results of the experiment. Section 5 concludes and discusses policy implications.
Experimental Design
The following experiment is designed to test the e↵ect of three regulatory designs on price competition and capacity provision in electricity markets. Compared to a benchmark treatment, we in one treatment increase the price cap. In another treatment we add a capacity market. In each case, subjects repeatedly over several periods compete to sell on the electricity spot market. Below we refer to a sequence of six of such periods as one round.
Demand. Demand for energy, D, is completely inelastic and stochastic. The probability distribution of demand is known to the subjects and is not symmetric: in each round, there are four first periods with low demand (7, 8 or 9 units with equal probability), and two last periods with high demand (23, 24 or 25 units with equal probability). Subjects are aware of the exact demand realization at the beginning of each period.
Supply. There are 4 firms (subjects) in one market. Subjects choose their capacity (up to 9 units) at the beginning of a round. There is a fixed cost of 7 per unit of capacity. Moreover, there is a simple marginal cost scheme: the first unit costs 1, the second costs 2, and so forth until the ninth unit. 
The price cap can either be 15 or 30 (see below for the description of the treatments). Note that prior to bidding subjects know the demand realization as well the capacity of their rivals. Thus each subject can identify if its capacity is needed to serve the entire demand.
Dispatch and pricing. The spot market clears as a uniform price auction. That is, in each period the computer finds the market supply by aggregating all four firms' supply functions, ordering all bids in increasing order. To find the market clearing price, the computer then dispatches the cheapest units first until demand is met. The last unit dispatched to serve demand sets the clearing price, p ⇤ , for all dispatched units. Figure 1 illustrates market clearing and depicts the competitive supply curve and market prices for all demand realizations.
Treatments. There are two treatment variables, the price cap and the capacity market. The price cap can be low (and equal 15) or high (and equal 30). As shown further below, given the investment costs a price cap of 15 does not make it viable to invest in peaking units, whereas it is viable to invest with a price cap of 30. With a capacity market, subjects can commit (for a monetary compensation) to build and o↵er capacity. With an energy only market, this option is not available. Our three treatments are referred to as LowCap (energy only market with a price cap of 15), HighCap (energy only market with a price cap of 30), and CapMarket (energy market with a price cap of 15 plus a capacity market). The CapMarket treatment only di↵ers from the LowCap treatment by the possibility for subjects to receive a compensation payment for each committed unit.
The maximum compensation payment allowed is 30 per unit. The treatments are summarized in Table 1 .
Price cap of 15 Price cap of 30

Energy-only market LowCap HighCap
Capacity market CapMarket - Table 1 : Treatments
Timing. The experiment consists of 10 rounds of 6 periods each. However, the timing of the game di↵ers across treatments. Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the round for the cases of LowCap and HighCap.
At the beginning of a round, in stage 1, subjects choose the capacity they want to have available for six periods in stage 2. The capacity can be any integer between 0 and 9. Note that within the round of six periods the capacity cannot be changed. At each period in stage 2, the exact level of demand is revealed. Subjects then submit their supply function. In order to give participants an occasion to learn about the market environment, the first two rounds di↵er from the remaining Figure 2 : Timing of a round for LowCap and HighCap eight; subjects cannot choose their capacity and each subject's production capacity is fixed at 9 units. In these first two rounds, there is no investment cost and only marginal cost. We implement this feature to allow the participants to practice how to play the game and exclude data from these first two rounds from our analysis.
As Figure 3 illustrates, the timing of a round is slightly di↵erent for the capacity market treatment, where there is a compensation for each unit of committed capacity. Hence, the first stage is divided in two steps. In step 1A (capacity market), subjects decide on their bids for the capacity commitment. They choose, for each unit of production capacity (up to 9 units), a monetary compensation (up to 30) for investing in capacity. The capacity stage is, as the energy spot market game, designed as a multi-unit uniform price procurement auction. The capacity demand is persistently set to 25 and so only the 25 lowest requests will be accepted. Recall that 25 is the maximum demand realization in the energy market and so demand rationing in the energy market is excluded if the capacity market clears.
In step 1B (capacity choice), subjects choose their capacity that at least has to comprise all units that received capacity payments.
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Stage 2 is identical as the one for LowCap case with a price cap that equals 15. Again, the first two rounds di↵er from the remaining eight. Subjects cannot choose their capacity and have de facto a generation capacity of 9 units. Again Procedure. A total of 92 students participated in the experiment, which was conducted at the University of Nottingham, UK. No subject participated in more than one session. We ran 6 sessions (two per treatment) and sessions lasted on average 2 hours, including instructions and payment. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree, Fischbacher (2007) . At the beginning subjects were seated at computer terminals and given a set of instructions, which were read aloud by the experimenter. Subjects were designated as firms randomly and anonymously assigned to groups of four. Each group then formed a quadropoly market. The composition of the group was not altered during a session. Subjects were paid according to their profit as a firm. We used an artificial laboratory currency experimental dollars (e, 1e = 100 eCents). Because predicted earnings di↵ered substantially across the three treatments, we adjusted the exchange rates such that expected cash earnings reflected the time subjects spent in the laboratory. On average, participants earned 13.33 (ca. $24 at the time of the experiment) for sessions lasting between 1 and 2 hours.
3 While the number of observation is still su cient for this treatment, the number however di↵ers from the baseline case and the capacity market treatment.
Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
In this section we discuss the theoretical implications of our game and formulate hypotheses. We solve this game by backward induction, discuss the pricing game first and subsequently the decision on the capacity provision.
Price choice and pivotal bidders
Our price subgame shares the basic features of uniform price auction models with capacity constrained firms analyzed amongst others in Fabra et al. (2006) . A central finding of this literature is that the equilibrium price depends on the number of pivotal bidders on the market, where a firm is pivotal if the market does not clear without its capacity. Hence the market clearing price depends not only on the demand realization and on aggregate market capacity but whether one or several capacity constrained firms are needed to serve the market demand. Given inelastic demand, the market price predictions are straightforward. If there is no pivotal bidder (i.e. demand can be served without having to rely on one critical firm's capacity), the equilibrium market price is the competitive one. In this case the market price equals the marginal cost of the last dispatched unit. When there is at least one pivotal bidder (i.e. all the demand can only be served if all firms produce), the price cap is the only equilibrium market price. The intuition behind that result is that once one or several firms know that the market does not clear without their capacity, it is profitable to bid above marginal costs and to increase the market price. With perfectly inelastic demand, the optimal bidding strategy of a withholding firm is to bid the price cap. These well-established results can be summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 : Define a pivotal firm j such thatq j > D Q j > 0, where
With at least one pivotal firm, the equilibrium price is the price cap.
With lemma 1 at hand, we are able to specify our main hypothesis on the price competition stage.
Hypothesis 1 (Market price and pivotal bidder): With at least one pivotal bidder, the equilibrium market price equals the price cap, irrespective of the treatment. When no pivotal bidder exists, the market price equals the marginal costs of the last dispatched unit.
Note that the likelihood of having a pivotal bidder in the market depends on the level of demand as well as the aggregate capacity, which in turn is a function of the individual capacity choice of stage 1. Also, for a given aggregate capacity, it is more likely that the market price is equal to the price cap (competitive price) with high (low) demand.
Capacity choice under di↵erent price caps
We now consider stage 1 of the experimental game and turn to the equilibria in capacities for the energy only markets in the LowCap and HighCap treatments. Instead of providing a formal analysis of the capacity game we lay out the (quasi-) symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. This does not preclude the existence of other equilibria as in Fabra et al. (2006) but su ces for stating hypothesis two. We first formulate these pure strategy equilibria in lemma 2.
Lemma 2 : The pure strategy equilibria in capacities are defined as:
1. 8 i 2 {1, 2, 3, 4} :q i = 6 in the LowCap treatment and 2. 8 i 2 {1, 2, 3, 4} :q i = 7 andq i = 6 in the HighCap treatment.
The intuition behind lemma 2 relates to the expected cost of running the seventh unit for a firm, given all the other firms are providing 6 units. Note first that the seventh unit is only dispatched when demand is equal to 25 units. Hence for any firm i the total expected cost of installing and running the seventh unit include the initial investment, 7, plus the marginal cost conditional on the seventh unit being dispatched, 7 ⇤ 2 3 , totalling to expected costs of 11 because the seventh unit is pivotal 4 Marginal costs of 7 only occur when the seventh unit is dispatched at a demand realization of 25, which can arise only during two of six periods per round and in each of these two periods with a probability of whenever demand is 25 and can be submitted at a market clearing bid of p. Note that for anyp < 17.5, the expected costs exceed the expected revenue and it is not beneficial to invest in the seventh unit. Lemma 2 can be reformulated to state the following hypothesis on the capacity provision.
Hypothesis 2 (Capacity choice and price cap): Underinvestment in the LowCap treatment and su cient investment in HighCap are predicted.
Hypothesis 2 states that none of the firms should invest in a seventh unit in LowCap because the price cap is 15 only. Therefore demand rationing can be expected with a demand of 25 units in this treatment. However the HighCap treatment in expectation yields su cient revenue. Furthermore, the equilibria in the HighCap treatment ⇣ 6, 6, 6, 7 ⌘ are prone to a coordination problem as investment decisions are simultaneous.
Capacity choice with a capacity market
In what follows we discuss the predicted capacity choice when firms have access to the capacity market. The CapMarket and LowCap treatments have an equivalent spot market environment with a price cap of 15. As stated in Lemma 2, investing in the seventh unit is not equilibrium strategy in the LowCap treatment. In contrast, with a capacity market, the 25 th committed unit earns revenues in the capacity market even if not dispatched. Following the same reasoning than for LowCap treatment outlined above, expected costs of the 25 th unit are 11 2 3 whereas expected revenue is nowp · 2 3 + f , where f is the compensation fee for each committed unit on the capacity market. Hence for any f > 5 3 expected revenue exceeds the expected cost and it is beneficial to invest in the seventh unit. We summarize this condition in the following lemma on the capacity choice with a capacity market.
Lemma 3: In the CapMarket treatment, the pure strategy equilibria in capacities are defined as in the HighCap treatment, 8i 2 {1, 2, 3, 4} :q i = 7 and q i = 6, for any capacity payment f > Hence, despite the low price cap, su cient investment is predicted for high enough capacity payments. Note that capacity market demand is fixed at 25 units and therefore even very high capacity payments cannot induce more capacity than compared to the HighCap treatment. Therefore predictions on equilibrium capacities are identical. We reformulate this lemma in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (Capacity choice and capacity market): Su cient investment in the CapMarket treatment is predicted if the capacity payments are equal to or larger than If hypothesis 3 is confirmed, then LowCap is likely to have more periods with pivotal bidders than CapMarket, because investment in the CapMarket treatment is higher and hence less often bidders will find themselves in a pivotal position. This in turn will imply that, according to Lemma 1, the market price is more often competitive in the CapMarket compared to the LowCap treatment. This pro-competitive e↵ect of the capacity market is similar to the one associated with forward markets (e.g. Allaz and Vila, 1993) . While with forward contracts the spot market demand is reduced and prices decline, with a capacity market, instead of a decline in spot demand, the increased capacity committment can thus lead to more competitive pricing.
Results
We first investigate the capacity choice by comparing aggregate capacity provision across treatments. Then we examine equilibrium pricing behavior. At last we discuss e cient capacity provision across the treatments and illustrate the importance of the price cap in either market design.
Capacity choice
Hypothesis 2 states that underinvestment only occurs in the LowCap but not in the HighCap treatment. Hypothesis 3 states that also in the CapMarket treatment su cient investment should be observed. Indeed, we find that capacity choices di↵er across treatments and are in line with theoretical predictions. Table 2 confirms that, on average, in LowCap the aggregate market capacity is with 21.8 below the maximum demand of 25.
5 Therefore periods occur in which the perfectly inelastic demand cannot be covered and has to be rationed. In LowCap, in 71 periods there is rationing as the aggregate capacity is to low to supply the demand. Thus as expected, the LowCap scenario features the highest amount of periods with rationing. Focusing on rounds 8 to 10 when subjects are familiar with the experiment, the average capacity in the LowCap treatment is 23.1 and very close to the theoretical prediction of 24 units. As appearent in Figure 4 it seems that subjects have learned over time to invest profitably and have increased capacity over time over the course of the ten rounds.
In contrast to LowCap there exists, on average, su cient capacity in both treatments HighCap and CapMarket.
6 Both treatments show average investment above maximum demand of 25. We conclude that doubling the price cap or adding a capacity market have similar e↵ect on security supply, i.e. su cient provision of capacity. cover fixed costs and accordingly investment reduced again in later rounds, then remaining at or around the predicted market capacity of 24 units.
Overall, the capacity market shows the highest investment level and the least number of markets with scarcity. Thus, while on average both treatments yield su cient investment, the procurement of capacity, naturally, avoids fluctuation in capacity provision that become apparent in Figure 4 for the HighCap treatment. Increased and stable investment in CapMarket results from positive capacity prices, which we discuss further below.
Price choice
As already discussed in section 3, the market price equilibrium depends on the existence of one or more pivotal bidders. Essentially, there are only two possibilities. Either the predicted price is a competitive marginal cost price or the predicted price is equal to the price cap which is 15 in LowCap and CapMarket and 30 in HighCap. Table 3 shows the average market clearing price with no or at least one pivotal player per period. prices tend to be high although not exactly matching the predicted price equal to the price cap. Moreover prices only di↵er significantly among the treatments in the case of pivotal bidder(s). Focusing only on periods with at least one pivotal bidder, Figure 5 depicts that the average energy price is lowest in CapMarket and highest in HighCap over all rounds of the experiment. In line with the increasing investment in HighCap shown in Figure 4 above, energy prices in HighCap are declining over time in Figure 5 . Interestingly, even with increasing investment the theory however predicts that -if at least one pivotal player exists -the clearing price should equal the price cap. Thus the declining clearing prices for the HighCap environment point to a di↵erence in the bidding strategies as the price cap and alongside competitive investment increased: Despite the existence of pivotal bidders, equilibrium prices drift away from the price cap. In the following we investigate the di↵erences in clearing prices across treatments in more detail.
Changing the price cap
We first compare the price choice in LowCap and HighCap treatments and investigate the treatment e↵ect of an increase in the price cap on the market price. According to hypothesis 1 we expect higher prices in the HighCap treatment. We control if at least one pivotal player existed (binary variable) and for excess capacity, D Q. As in Section 3, a player j is pivotal whenever D Q j > 0.
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Excess capacity should in theory not determine the market price. We add excess capacity to account for the degree of competition in the market. The intuition is as follows. We know from Lemma 1 that if there is at least one pivotal bidder the price cap is the equilibrium market price and the 'price cap-setter' can only be a pivotal bidder. Holding the number of pivotal bidders constant, higher excess capacity implies that any pivotal player foregoes a higher amount of sales by being price cap-setter as the alternative is to sell all capacity and undercut rival bidders. Hence, higher excess capacity may reduce the incentives to become the price capsetter and may yield a lower market price than the price cap.
As a dependent variable, besides the treatment e↵ect on the market price, we are in addition interested in the di↵erence of the clearing price to the price cap, measured as the ratio p⇤ p . As illustrated in Figure 5 subjects have submitted clearing bids further away from the price cap in the HighCap treatment. Thus we expect a negative treatment e↵ect on this ratio. Table 4 presents the regression results and illustrates how the market price and the ratio of clearing prices to the price cap di↵er between LowCap and HighCap. As expected, the market price increases significantly, by about 4.8, when the price cap is doubled, see column (1).
Furthermore, in HighCap, the ratio of the market price to the price cap decreases significantly (see column (3) in Table 4 ), indicating that a higher price cap does not translate into equally higher market prices. This result is in stark contrast with the theoretical prediction formulated in Lemma 1.
To test the robustness of our findings, we in addition consider only rounds 8 to 10 in columns (2) and (4) respectively, when bidders should have advanced in their experience and bidding strategies.
(1) Further, the estimated coe cients for excess capacity and the e↵ect of a pivotal player are as theory predicts and illustrate the strong magnitude of a average price increase of about 13 whenever the energy market price is determined by pivotal bidders. Also the ratio increases significantly whenever pivotal bidders exist.
Adding a capacity market
Next, we investigate how price choices are e↵ected in the CapMarket compared to the LowCap treatments, using the same specification as above. Given the identical price cap in these two treatments and according to hypothesis 1 we expect similar market prices. Indeed, Table 5 below shows no significant treatment e↵ect and confirms this finding both for all rounds, see column (1), and for rounds 8 to 10 only, see column (2). This result may be explained by the fact that both the LowCap and the CapMarket treatments show about a similar number of periods with pivotal players. In either case, in one third of all periods a pivotal player existed (136 out of 384 periods in LowCap and 121 out of 384 periods in CapMarket), as already shown in Table 3 above.
(1) Table 5 : LowCap and CapMarket.
The e↵ect of at least one pivotal bidder is still highly significant. The estimates on the e↵ect of a pivotal player on both the market price and on the ratio are similar in both the HighCap and the CapMarket treatments.
8 . However, the treatment e↵ect of adding a capacity market on the ratio of clearing prices to the price cap is not singificant, as opposed to the HighCap treatment. Based on Table 5 , we cannot confirm a pro-competitive e↵ect of the capacity market. Additional investments did not alter the market structure and such that, still, pivotal bidders existed in many periods. In these periods the clearing price then equalled the price cap, as predicted by hypothesis 1. however with about 6.8 smaller than for the HighCap treatment.
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In the Appendix we provide results when adding a control for the level of demand. There, the treatment e↵ect is negative, but again not significant when considering only the last rounds when subjects have learned.
10 Despite slightly lower energy prices in the CapMarket regime as shown in Figure 5 we however cannot confirm that the capacity market had a significant e↵ect on the energy price. The first-order e↵ect remains the reduction of periods with demand rationing, induced by positive capacity prices.
Capacity prices
Equilibrium capacity market prices are on average at or around the level of fixed costs of peaking units, as can be seen in Figure 6 that plots a histogramm of capacity prices. The capacity price on average is 8.3 with a minimum of 2.4, a maximum of 20, and a relatively low standard deviation of 2.9. Instead, the capacity price approximately equals fixed costs of peak units (being slightly higher than fixed costs of 7 for the 25 th unit). Figure 6 depicts, next to the capacity price, the histogram on the fixed cost of units that are remunerated in the capacity market. Comparing both histograms illustrates how the capacity market is used for obtaining reimbursement for investments.
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As subjects have used the capacity market for reimbursement of fixed costs, it can be conjectured that the energy price is of less relevance for guiding investment. 
Capacity provision in HighCap vs. CapMarket.
Both the HighCap and the CapMarket treatments lead to an increase in capacity provision as compared to the basline LowCap case. Below we dicuss total costs for this increase, where total costs are the costs to consumers and comprise energy and capacity prices. We focus on capacity provision at least cost and do not address welfare for two reasons. First, we cannot observe the maximum willingness to pay, respectively the value of lost load. Hence we cannot construct consumer surplus, and crucially, cannot construct losses in consumer surplus whenever rationing occurs. Second, given inelastic demand and no rationing, capacity provision at least costs is equivalent to capacity provision at highest consumer surplus, which we in the following assume to be the regulatory objective.
In particular, we compare the costs to provide the 25 th generation unit, the unit needed to serve maximum peak demand. By construction of the experiment, subjects were missing revenues to build this 25 th unit only in the LowCap regime.
In the HighCap treatment, the 25 th unit is incentivized by the possibility of high energy prices. In the CapMarket treatment, the 25 th unit is incentivized by the capacity price. . Costs to consumers with the parameters used in the experiment are lower in the CapMarket treatment. Note that this comparison is heavily influenced by our choice of the high price cap. The results therefore stress the importance of the price cap in either design. In the CapMarket treatment, the price cap could potentially have been lowered to avoid abuse of market power in the energy market, with su cient units being procured in the capacity market. In the HighCap treatment, the price cap could potentially also have been lower. In the last rounds the average energy price with pivotal players was around 20, which still is enough to cover expected costs of the peaking unit.
Conclusion
This article explores experimentally the capacity provision and resulting price competition under di↵erent electricity market designs. Specifically, we analyze capacity provision under three di↵erent regulatory regimes: a price cap regime restricting scarcity rents (LowCap), a price spike regime allowing for scarcity rents (HighCap) and a capacity market regime (CapMarket). Each environment is motivated by market designs that are applied in di↵erent power markets across the globe. The LowCap baseline environment is chosen so that underinvestment prevails in equilibrium. In the experiment, we confirm that underinvestment indeed occurs in this baseline case.
We then treat the market with a higher price cap that in theory allows for sufficient investment (HighCap) and a capacity market in which by design su cient capacity is procured. We find that lifting the price cap and adding a capacity market cure underinvestment. While in the latter case investment is fixed and paid for via the capacity market, in the former we find evidence that price spikes are regulated by competitive investment and that for adequate price cap levels the laisser-faire environment is able to provide su cient investment.
For our analysis and in the experiment we have employed a perfectly inelastic demand. Many argue that a flexible demand side will ensure e cient capacity provision and that currently because of a lack of real-time metering and billing (Soft, 2002) e cient market-clearing is not possible at all times. Moreover, as Borenstein and Holland (2003) point out, a hybrid system, where some customers see real time prices and others see time-invariant prices (or flat-rate service), induces ine ciency. As these flaws are being removed with the advent of smart-metering, it would be interesting to compare our di↵erent market design treatments and their e↵ect on pricing and capacity provision with an elastic demand side.
(1) 
